

FURTHER NOTES ON IMAGES

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Last year's installment of this inquiry (*Spring 1977*, pp. 62-88, hereafter referred to by page numbers in square brackets) laid out by means of a few examples some ways of contrasting images with symbols, of working with images and examining dreams as images, and ended with a demonstration of the value of that perplexing word 'archetypal.' This year we shall fill in a bit more of the same ground, and we shall also offer some gadgetry useful in handling dreams as images.

So, what follows are miscellaneous excerpts from a work in progress that do not cohere into the continuity of an article. However, I do want to begin by picking up where I left off last year so as to deliver on a promise about why interpretations that "click" are wrong.

Radical Relativism and the Click

An Icelandic proverb says: "Every dream comes true in the way it is interpreted." This states several curious things about dreams and their interpretations. One: dreams come true. Two: dreams come true because of interpretations. Three: there are many truths since there are many interpretations. So the maxim takes us into the heart of radical relativism. Anything goes. There is a God behind whatever happens. All analogies drawn from an image are equally valid. Nothing objective to hold to; no 'true' truth because there are many truths. Ultimately, nothing presented in an image or stated about an image is better or worse than anything else. The imagistic approach is not only relativist; it is cynical and nihilist.

The Icelandic proverb is important because it says that what we do with dreams comes true somehow, somewhere, and unless we can work out the difference between a right interpretation and wrong ones, wrong things will come true.

Protestor: "You seem at last to be holding out hope for practical guidelines so that we can tell when we are making a good or right interpretation. Until now, each time I have pressed you for clear-cut indications, you have danced out of my corner, demonstrating less what to do than your own fancy footwork."

Maybe that footwork demonstrates the tactical way to answer general kinds of questions. It exhibits two main principles: *parry strategic questions with a tactical operation* and *stick to the image*. You know, it's not altogether what we say in this inquiry but equally how we behave that shows our methods. So, in regard to the radical relativism of interpretation, let's operate with a dream. Berry has already given us an excellent occasion. Her paper (*Spring 1974*, pp. 58-79) opens with a woman patient's short dream:

I was lying on a bed in a room, alone apparently, but with the feeling of turmoil around me. A middle-aged woman enters and hands me a key. Later, a man enters, helps me out of bed and leads me upstairs to an unknown room.

Then follow seven different interpretations of it, any of which could be convincing, valid perspectives — radical relativism. However, Berry's concern is not with the right-or-wrong of these interpretations. She is concerned more with the suppositions of the interpreter than with the accuracy of the interpretation. She is interested in the insight afforded the interpreter by recognizing which particular line he or she takes for approaching the dream.

Protestor: "What about the patient who had the dream?"

We have to see our suppositions about the dream in order to see the patient who is in the dream. The patient doesn't exist independent of the dream or of our suppositions about it.

Protestor: "The patient can correct your suppositions. I know when an interpretation is right because it clicks."

We'll come to that "click" in a moment. But first let's make clear what Berry's paper did. It made us realize that even a simple dream has polysemous (many-meaning) possibilities which show in the seven different interpretations.

Protestor: "Even if all seven are right, surely some are closer to the truth, or better analogies, or more right than others."

Right, closer to the truth, better — this begs the question. Let me show you what I mean: Let's say that the dream of the woman is the beginning of an Icelandic fairytale. The woman dreamer sets off upon seven different paths, one after another, coming to seven different modes of the dream coming true. The "right interpretation" would then be the one which leads the woman furthest in accordance with whatever goals she wants to "come true" in her life. If her goal, say, is spiritual development by means of introversion, then the right interpretation is the one which says that by facing inner turmoil in seclusion she receives aid from her inner femininity and is led to a higher level by her inner guiding-spirit (animus) (Interpretation #5). But if we imagine the patient's goal to be feeling relationship, then the right interpretation is the one which says that when the patient is cut off and isolated, she is in turmoil, passive to what happens, and easily led into upper stories by an unknown (unconscious) animus (Interpretation #2).

Protestor: "I couldn't agree more! It's what I've always believed: we can only interpret a dream in relation to the context of the patient's life. We have to know the patient and what the problem is before we can say a word about the dream. Interpretation #5 makes sense only for a patient for whom #2 would be definitely wrong, and vice versa."

But I don't agree. Your conclusion to this demonstration is not at all what I had intended. You are saying that the dream fits into the patient's picture of the problem and her wishes for resolving it. Thus a right interpretation serves the ego personality and its central wishes. A dream comes true when it clicks with these wishes. This language of "coming true" belongs to the wishful world of fairytale, as David Miller exposed in these pages in 1976.

'Right interpretation' belongs in that world too. Let's try instead to see what the dream says — without suppositions about the patient's problem, wishes for resolving it, or interpretations that click so that the dream comes true.

The dream has its dreamer "lying on a bed." What happens, happens to her as a lying-on-a-bed-I — a situation which may stand for supine passivity, horizontality, Yin, etc., but which I feel is best

left in its own words. A key is handed to this bedded "I," and only to this specific I position, by a middle-aged woman. The key, the lying on a bed, and the middle-aged woman are an interconnected image. No lying down, no key; no middle-aged woman, no key. To be a lying down woman on a bed is how to receive a middle-aged woman with a key.

The key is handed (in contrast to given, passed, offered), so that handing is the way she gets a key, and may be a key. However, the key is not what takes her upstairs. She does not go up by being keyed up, but by being helped and led. Between the woman who enters and the man who enters is the key that is in her hands.

The woman enters while the dream-ego is embedded in lying down. Is this the *only* way middle-age can enter her space? When the middle-aged woman enters there is a feeling of turmoil. Turmoil is not in her, but around her; not around in the room, but around her in feeling. This is precisely where the middle-aged woman enters with the key, interconnecting her feeling of being alone and in turmoil with the personification of middle-age. Might we say that the key she is handed is precisely being bedded down inside a feeling of turmoil, for that is where the dream-image places her so that she can receive the middle-aged key woman.

When she is alone, then she is with her feeling. She is with her feeling, even if apparently alone. There is a disjunction between her aloneness and her turmoil, signalled by the word "but." Does she expect something else when alone on a bed rather than turmoil?

Although being led upstairs by a man can be interpreted in many ways from orgasmic climax to paranoid isolation, these are projective suppositions of the interpreter. Partly they may be evoked in the interpreter by the "unknown room" to which the man leads. As interpreter, I must watch out lest I fill her unknown room with furnishings from my own head.

The dream itself says only that lying on a bed leads upstairs, that the room above is unknown (her unknown space is above her lying down space, and to get there she takes steps), that upstairs helps her out of bed, that "out of bed" equals help, and that the dream proceeds from past to present, moving from "was lying" to "helps me

out" and "leads me." We note a hiatus marked by the word "later," so that the distinction between the parts of the image is announced by a temporal adverb, an action in the language of time; the image itself suggests a story with steps.

We also note the curious realization within the dream that when apparently alone she is evidently not alone, that "alone" constellates kinds of reality, for then she is entered by both a woman and a man, even though apparently she is alone.

From this recapitulation of the dream, much in the manner of our demonstrations last year, we see that Berry's alternative interpretations #5 and #2 each apply equally well, or unwell. Instead of envisioning the seven alternatives as differing paths, one of which is right or true, let us take them as seven aspects of the same image. They are each right inasmuch as they analogize with it; but they are each wrong insofar as they leave the dream speech.

If all seven are "images of the image," there is no right path (perspective). There is no need for a click to tell us the way; there is no right key to the dream. The dream is enclosed in its combination of images and we must twirl all the tumblers. Moreover, each bit is inherently related and necessary to all the other bits. *A wrong path into the dream occurs when we take one path only.*

Protestor: "So this is how a polytheistic psychology works in practice?"

Yes. Wrongness now means singleness. The constructs of right and wrong imply an either/or world, not the polysemous, polyvalent one of dreams and images. When we realize the inherent multiplicity of meaning in the image itself, we cannot force the dream into any single truth.

When I restate the dream close to its own speech, I have not taken any of the seven paths toward any of the seven goals of her conscious life. Nor have I tried to fit the dream into her or my notions of her context and problem. Yet all of the seven have been implied by the image, even though none of them has been supposed by the interpreter. I have stuck with the image. . . .

Protestor: ". . . but not interpreted the dream!"

That is an open question. I believe I have interpreted the dream,

inasmuch as the dream is its own best interpretation. By this I mean: Translation re-locates the dream directly into her life by suppositions about her life. Instead of translating it and supposing it into one or another meaning, I have amplified it by letting it speak in multiple restatements. Restatement serves it best because the image is usually not full enough to our untrained ears that miss undertones and overtones. Restatement also synchronously relates the dream to many parts of that larger image which is her life. So, I am neither taking the dream out of her life, nor opposing it to her life, nor translating it wholly into her life. Rather, my interpretation works at deepening that life by means of its metaphorical analogies with the dream. This may make possible an imagination of life which restores to it its dream.

Protestor: "So then there is no right interpretation, and the dream comes true in multiple ways. I understand that this happens because your method does not translate from the speech of the dream (middle-aged, later, upstairs, apparently) into the language of psychology (passivity, isolated, inner femininity, animus). But still, how do you know when to stop? I asked you that last year. Analogizing can go on and on; more and more complexity. Don't we still need a click that indicates when the dream has come home?"

Not at all! The click is a sign of singleness of meaning, and indeed it does stop the analogizing process, ending it with a literalism: "Aha, this is what the dream truly means." But we have to ask: means to whom, to what? And the answer will be to the ego which wants a meaning that it can use for a key. I am suspicious of interpretations that click because they imply an already made mechanism into which the dream fits. A good interpretation does not 'click,' but 'ferments' or 'stains' or 'illuminates' or 'wounds.' The only 'clicks' that refer to dream interpretations are those when-then connections which show us where the dream holds itself together and how it inheres in our psychic life. It's the click of the dream with itself, its interlocking necessity, that is important, not the click of it into the patient's mental set.

Besides, if the value of an interpretation is determined wholly by its effect on the patient, then a cheap conversion works as well as a

subtle insight, a magical suggestion is no different from a careful feeling, a demagogic cliché equal to a home truth. Or, as Berry herself has put it:

It [the click] opens the way to an aspect of psychotherapy little different from charlatanism, syntonio transference neurosis, hysterical suggestion, doctrinal compliance, religious conversion and political brainwashing. For these too "click" and in these too the subject feels himself changed for the better on the basis of insights revealed.

To wrap up this section in a few plain statements. A dream interpretation clicks into a single meaning; if there is no singleness of meaning, there is no click. Analogizing [pp. 86-8] does not come to a stop, for it is a process of deepening the image, and the depth of an image, like that of a psyche, is endless. A well-interpreted dream therefore *goes on being dreamt* in restatement even more fully and vividly than in its original nighttime appearance. Interpretation is an imaginative revisioning which enhances and amplifies the dream. The way in which a dream comes true is the way truths come from the dream — by means of analogizing. If the analogizing process goes on long and deeply, the truths that come are many, are radical, and are always relative to the dream's images.

Protestor: "I am not convinced, but I did enjoy watching you parry a strategic question with a tactical operation."

You are not supposed to become convinced. The game of inquiry would be over if the *Protestor* ceased his protesting.

Images and Pictures

Why do we talk about images as if they were pictures? Is this mix-up just one of easy talk? Is it inherent, like the German word *Bild* which means both an image and a picture, even a painting? A *Bildbauer* (sculptor) is an image-hewer and a *Bildmaler* (painter) is an image-painter. Or is the confusion of images with pictures a residue of sensationist psychology that understands images and even imagination to be left-overs of actual things seen?

In therapy the muddling of image and picture gives trouble: patients think they have to see pictures in their minds in order to have an image. If I ask them for an image of what is going on in a

problem (of family, of sexual relations, of anger), they try to *see* something, and when they don't find anything to see, they say they have no image, no fantasy. The confusion gives trouble to theory too. People accuse imagistic therapy of being mainly visual, hence optical and intellectually distant, hence gutless.

Are images flat, two-dimensional mental things that I look at? Let's turn to dreams to inquire.

When I look at a dream in the morning, recording it for my dream book, it is like a picture. I try to see it as it was, picture it in my mind. I may even squint my eyes, as I try to get the details of the image; very visual.

But when I am in the dream at night it is like a scene; and when I am pervaded by the dream during the day, it is like a mood. Here, the dream is the constant, and whether it becomes a pictured event that I look at depends on my approach to it. An image perceived as a picture can tend to become optical and intellectual and distanced. It there, we here. But imagined as a scene, I can get into it; and when imaged as a mood, it gets into me. This shows again the usefulness of referring to an image as context, mood, and scene [p. 62]; when considered in this light, an image cannot be something only set before my eyeballs, or even before my mind's eye, since it is also something into which I enter and by which I am embraced. Images hold us; we can be in the grip of an image. Indeed they can be gutsy.

So the complaint that imagistic therapy is gutless is the complaint of a consciousness that *pictures* its images and regards them optically. It is a consciousness that hasn't got into the image as a body. Maybe the complaint is a fear of these very guts, and defends itself against the image-body by insisting images are pictures only, only mental things seen, hallucinations, phantasms.

Protestor: "Still, we do use the same word in German for both, *Bild*; and in English we use the same verb, 'see' for image and pictures."

But no longer exclusively. The word *image* is nowadays breaking free of optical seeing. People say: "I get the image," "That's not my image," "He's ruined his image." Here, "image" does not refer

to a picture in the sense of a photographic likeness of a person. Rather, "image" is a complex notion of a person imagined by the mind.

But you are on the right track, Protestor, even if you are getting off one station too soon. The similarity goes further than two senses of "see," perception and vision. What makes pictures and images alike is their presentational quality. An image presents itself and pictures do this too; in fact, this is what pictures do best. They fill the field of vision with their presence, drawing us more and more into their space. What makes images like pictures is just this independent presence of the image that seems to stand still, or at least stands me still, before it, as does a picture. So it is not that the image *is* a picture, but that the image is *like* a picture. The analogy has been mistaken for an identity, much as the vision with which one "sees" an image has been mistaken as identical with visual, optical sight.

As the eye watching a picture both concentrates and darts, so the mind confronted with an image starts racing even as it stands still. This double action discloses levels and builds complexities without ever leaving the scene, without ever going beyond the dumb object with which it is presented. Like a picture, an image too has borders. It sticks to itself, inheres within itself. It doesn't lead somewhere else, as does a story. Thus the mind's activity can find nowhere to go but more deeply into the image. Time doesn't enter pictures. When one looks at a painting, it doesn't matter where the artist first put his brush or what he painted last. One can't say his last stroke resolves the picture and was its lysis. All the parts are happening at once. Their "mutual modification," in Coleridge's phrase, is also mutual temporality, synchronous. When a dream is written out as a story, the end comes after the beginning and is its result. But when we take the same dream as an image, then the last sentence can be heard in terms of the first (or any other) and can result in the first (or any other). The connections between the parts of a life, including its end in death, can also be taken as the interrelated images of a larger image, and not only as a story through time. Picasso, who was a painter, understood his life as multiple self-portraits in facing mir-

rors, images of himself that did not narrate a story through time. He said: "I don't develop. I am."

And we might add: I am only within the limits of the image; our possibilities are limited to the dimensions of each particular frame.

Our confusion of image with picture has now been clarified as an analogy between them. And this analogy with pictures may teach us something about how to look at an image. Certainly we learn that there is nowhere else to look but further at or into the image. It holds our attention — and what is attention but a primary definition of consciousness? And our attention is held in the present; so an image makes us present to ourselves, convokes consciousness to be all present and at attention. This implies that attending to images makes for a precise presence of consciousness. (No wonder we get tired so quickly in galleries and museums or in doing active imagination.)

We also learn that the muteness of an image is essential for altering our habitual mind's way of experiencing in language, that is, in stories made up of sentences, strung out in time, based on words, letters, literal. As a picture stops our syntax, so an image stops our clock. People often talk about 'eternal images,' but now we are removing the metaphysics from that idea, returning it to operational experience. The imagistic view eternalizes (see below) in that it moves us out of a temporal way of regarding things. It's not that images are eternal (in an archetypal realm of the Gods); but rather that images, like paintings, have all their parts going on concurrently, simultaneously. There is no before and after, and so the image is always going on, eternally present. So, to get out of time, make images. (Is this why so many painters live so long?)

These similarities in what we do, feel, and think when in the presence of images and pictures make them akin, justifying the German word *Bild* for both. This kinship in response makes me believe it rather a fortunate thing to confuse the two, providing we keep their kinship as analogy, remembering to distinguish between two analogous senses of "seeing." When we look at each dream as a picture of ourselves, it will then be less a message that helps pro-

gram our lives, and more a self-portrait in the frames of whose silent testimony we stand reflecting further and further into our nature.

Image-Making

Protestor: "Something fishy is going on in your demonstration. On the one hand you speak about images and pictures. But on the other hand what you are doing is not pictorial and instead is highly verbal. Why all this interest in speech when you have just praised the image for its 'muteness'?"

Take care here, *Protestor*. Don't get literal about muteness, as dumb, non-verbal simplistics. The muteness of the image, I said, is a necessary realization for altering our habitual way of experiencing in language, our habitual way of telling our dreams. Our usual ways of speech may keep us from hearing what the image is saying. And a main determinant of the volume of an image resides in the multiple implications of its *words*. To get at this volume, this amplification, we have to break through the roles assigned to words by grammar and syntax; we must break the literalism of the parts of speech. For we have been sentenced by our sentences. In grammar and syntax is lodged the fundament of our collective unconsciousness and its non-imaginal singleness of mind. We are unconscious in the very instrument of our consciousness: our speech.

So, to work with images we need more than symbology, more than psychology in its psychodynamic analytical sense, and more than archetypology. We are forced toward the field of those who are specialists in images — the field of aesthetics in its broadest sense, and also in one of its narrowings, the scrutiny of the verbal imagination, poetics.

This move toward aesthetics seems an inevitable consequence of Jung's having based psychic reality upon fantasy-images, a term which he said he took from poetic usage (*CW* 6, 743). His theory of images announced a poetic basis of mind, and active imagination put it in practice, even while Jung went on using scientific and theological language for his explanations. Part of what archetypal psychology is trying to do is follow Jung consequently along lines

he opened but did not pursue himself. One of these lines is poetics: the exploration of image-making in words. Let us inquire into how this is done.

Did you notice last year that the words of the dream [p. 63] that one takes to be symbols, the words one looks up to amplify, are *nouns*, e.g., arrow, cave, swan, leg, or adjectives used as nouns, like numbers and colors. One way of breaking out of the symbolic mode and returning to the freshness of the image would be to modify these symbols so that they could no longer be looked up. We can qualify swan, knee, or arrow, moving them back from general terms to the particularized nouns that appeared in the image: cave-swan, wobbly knee, five arrows. We can stick even more closely to the image by speaking of breasted-arrows, many-angled arrows, for that is how the arrows were actually presented by the dream.

Noun combinations of this sort recall the imaging language we find in American Indian names: Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Black Elk; and also in nicknames: Slim Jim, Big Red, Mac the Knife. The Greeks too spoke of the Gods and Goddesses in this way. Athene or Poseidon require epithets, like grey-eyed Athene, Gorgon-bearing Athene, earth-shaking Poseidon, sea-maned Poseidon. We have to remember that the way our monotheistic consciousness conceives the Gods, as distinct abstractions that can be organized in a dictionary, is not how these figures appear to a polytheistic imagination. The Greeks had no index, not even a mythology book.

We have now made an advance by qualifying the nouns more specifically with adjectives. But still the nouns are the Chief Words (*Hauptwörter*), who carry the burden, and the adjectives are secondary, only ad-jected or thrown onto the nouns.

We may go further still, following Berry (*Spring* 1974, pp. 63-4, 68-9) and the idea of the *reversibility* of the image. If the various parts of an image are reversible, then why not the parts of its speech? Let us imagine a blue arrow in a dream. "The arrow is blue" can also be stated as: the blue is arrow-like; is arrowly, arrowish; is arrowing.

Not only does your arrow — and I am addressing the dreamer — take you into the blue, come from out of the blue, bring the blues,

seem true blue, and so on. But also, in reverse, your blueness comes in arrow shape, straight as an arrow, arrowing sharply. You have an arrowy blueness, and the nature of blue in you, according to this dream, is pointed, swift, shafting, feathered, straight, airborne, flying, aimed. . . .

And to take another example, "black snake" can state both that your snake is black and also that your black is snakey: creepy, hidden, reptilian, ancestral — and whatever other adjectives we need to give a snake quality to black.

Principle: Not only can images be reversed; the act of reversing is a step in making images.

Warning: Reversals sometimes can be helped by *punning*. Puns spin a word into another sense: swan in a cave, a caved swan, a caved-in swan. Similar to puns are elliptical collapses: Your arrow is your oyster — you can open it like a bluepoint. Joyce was the master of this imagistic word-play. But we are mostly not masters, and instead of following Joyce, we follow his daughter's schizy anima-ish playwords that do not make an image but skitter away from it sideways, an elliptical jump over the shadow, what Jung called Klang-associations, an amusement without body.

These examples — caved-in swan, bluepoint oyster, a-musement — don't make an image or help with the ones we have. Possibly in another context, in another writer's or dreamer's hands, they could be important because they would resonate. But here these puns have worked surrealistically, in keeping with a Dadaistic sense of the image, a startle without soul, the dream world without its under-world sense. There are puns, and puns — some are shafts of illumination in which the play on words unpacks depth and builds intensity. Poesis. But others, such as these, keep us only to the words (not the images) by means of irrelevant associations, such as oysters. These associations then command attention for themselves, so that soon we have left the blue arrow in search of pearls, cabbages, and kings. Words have magic. They can inflate, take us on manic flights, invent worlds to inhabit — all defenses against the image. We protect ourselves from the attractive pull of words by "sticking to the image." By means of this maxim we can test the value of any pun.

Let's look again at what we did with that blue arrow. At first it seemed as if a *blue* arrow was less a symbol and more an image than arrow alone. But actually, by keeping to usual grammar where nouns carry adjectives, the adding of blue to the arrow gave the noun even more weight and substance. We did make a move, but not far enough. For though the arrow got more precisely qualified, it also became more fixed, more substantial. Actually its nominative power increased by virtue of the adjective, blue.

So we reversed the grammar. We freed the noun from its fixity, the arrow from having to be so sharply stuck in its own substantiality. It too can be a qualifier, even present itself in multiple modes — adjective, adverb, or verb (to arrow, is arrowing, arrowed). We dissolved the nominative substance (the arrow as naming a thing) into metaphor (the arrow as a shifting action and many-faceted qualification). Since this verbal action and adjectival qualification always also bears its nominative substance (the noun, arrow), metaphor echoes right in the word itself. It sounds as several parts of speech, playing several roles, at any given moment. We no longer hear it make only one kind of sense.

Another principle: Where the symbolic view tends to *substantiate* (make nouns of) even adjectives and verbs, the imagistic view tends to *dissolve* nouns themselves into qualities and actions. *The chief words in an image do not depend on their grammar.* We are working toward what Rudolf Ritsema has called a syntax of the imaginal: the parts of speech freed from their narrational obligations which link them into time sequences for storytelling.

The imagistic view of words frees them from having to submit to logical reason and operational definition. No word would be restricted to mean only one thing according to its operational usage. Instead, the full extension of any word, all its meanings and all its grammatical possibilities could be brought into any context in which the word appears. Freed from the chains of grammatical usage, words would no longer implicate us in causal readings of dreams. (This caused that, subjects acting upon objects, helped by adverbs and adjectives, prepositions and conjunctions.) We would be able to read a dream as we read a metaphysical or lyric poem, as

an imagistic statement. The words in the dream, like those in a poem, would not be responsible to any semantic principles above and beyond the image, principles which would dictate what words mean and how they must fit together independent of their appearance. Instead of grammar and syntax determining what is meant in the dream, the dream's words would gain their sense from their inherent intelligibility (the angel in the word) and from the help of their friends, the community or context of the image in which the words inhere. And the first move in this dissolution of grammar is letting go of nouns.

If we can effectively let go of our reliance on nouns, we will have taken an important step away from the symbolic perspective. It needs nouns, and turns other parts of speech into them. For example, the adjective *red* must become the nominative, redness, in order for it to be amplified as a universal concept. Red moves from a staining, emotional qualifier to a quality that can stand alone as a symbolic abstraction. Therefore, one can discuss the symbolic meaning of redness apart from any image in which it appears. This conceptual move of adjectives into nouns is also done to verbs. The verb *hunt*, to the symbolic perspective, becomes the general motif of hunting, a concept which we can look up in a dictionary of folklore, primitive art, or in an anthropological cross-index. The symbolic view requires concepts and so it starts with nouns. They are the *Hauptwörter*.

But to the imagistic perspective, nouns themselves lose their exclusively substantive and substantiating function. This function, in fact, is viewed as only one of the many modes in which a word can function, so that each and any word becomes multiple and may be heard as a metaphor. If last year we broke up our usual dream-reading habits by removing punctuation [p. 73], this year we are breaking up another usual habit which identifies words with their grammatical roles. Nouns are not restricted to playing the parts of subjects and objects of actions, bearers of qualifiers, namers of things. An arrow may arrow, be arrowly, arrowize. This de-substantiation aids de-literalizing.

Protestor: "I can't see why you have to destroy normal speech in order to deliteralize it. Surely you can make a metaphor just by the

way you *hear* a word. That verb 'hunt,' when used by a scholar in a library who is tracking down an obscure reference, or by an analyst who is on the spoor of a hidden anxiety or a camouflaged meaning, is already metaphorical. No need to talk in terms of their being hunty or huntly searching to build an image or hear a metaphor."

Quite right. It isn't necessary to twist words — if one can hear them resonate. You heard the metaphor to begin with or you could not have transposed into your image of the scholar and the analyst such words from the hunt as tracking, spoor, and camouflage.

Usually, we don't hear and can't build an image. This is especially true with verbs. Some can be looked up as symbols: hunt, dance, steal, pray, plow, bake. These are motifs of folklore and religion. But what about to turn, to swim, to hurry, to look, and hundreds more that commonly appear in dreams? We tend to take them at face value without listening for a metaphorical, deliteralizing echo. Instead of resonating, they fade away as our attention notices 'bigger' words. We need aids that amplify these ordinary verbs.

So, a first step in imaging a verb is to keep it attached to an adverb: *hurry desperately, turn away, quietly leave*. Already an image is forming. Next, if we reverse the verb/adverb roles, we have: to despair hurriedly, to quiet leavingly. We gain insight into the behavior of the dream ego who hurries his desperation, whose mode of quieting is to leave or whose away-moves are in the form of turns. Also, we can gain therapeutic insights from the verb-image as a specific mechanism; "turning," for instance. We would be on the watch in the analytical conversation for the patient's turns of phrase, of topic, of interest, for these would reflect his absencing or manner of avoidance, his being away.

Verbs combined with adverbs, and verbs reversed into adverbs, can't be looked up as symbols. One can study the symbolic meaning of smiling (the smile of the Gods) or combing (the fairytale comb) as universal motifs, but one cannot look up *smiling sheepishly* or *combing languidly*. Just as the living image begins to show, amplification fails utterly. No research into the meanings of smile and sheep can catch the image.

Dream-Words: Concepts vs. Images

Protestor: "Let's go back to the arrow and the cave. As you worked up arrow, ringing through its verbal changes, it became clearer that they all could be included under the concept, aggression. So, what is the advantage of speaking of arrowly and arrowing rather than of aggressivity? Why invent words like caving and cavernity instead of saying capacity for depth (or for receptivity, silence, or inner space)? Why replace the standard traits of character psychology with these oddly twisted verbal images?"

First, images evoke, and so they carry more unconsciousness with them. They speak to the unconscious, whereas concepts address the conscious — to use those classical terms. Second, imagistic speech is more therapeutic also because it allows for wider analogies, suggests more implications. One begins to feel arrows and arrowing happening in many ways through one's life.

Protestor: "Aggression has many dimensions, too. You may be verbally or sexually aggressive, use aggression in defense, be aggressive especially toward women, etc. A concept like aggression has an additional value: we can collect under its head various instances of it, like aggressive dreams. These would extend way beyond arrow dreams. Your image approach doesn't allow even for comparing two different arrow dreams."

It certainly doesn't. I am not doing science, in the old sense of it. A collection of arrow dreams takes us back to approaching dreams conceptually, back to symbols, back to nouns. You see, I am not attempting a scientific study of "arrow dreams" but inquiring into what your arrow is doing in your dream. What arrows do elsewhere in a sample of arrow dreams is relevant only when it can become a therapeutic analogy. Scientific facts become psychological information only when they have therapeutic bearing. And this they can have only when the facts too have become images. Your question continues to treat the arrow image as a concept.

The difference between images and concepts has been laid out often enough and by better hands. But still, let's listen to the difference between aggression and arrow: He is aggressive *vs.* He comes

on like an arrow. She is so full of aggression *vs.* She has a quiver full of arrows. We hear a further advantage of the image in that it speaks just as the world speaks, concretely, and as dreams speak, sensately. Images bring body and concepts remove body. Aggression, remember, cannot be seen. It presents itself only by means of an image, as clenched fists or teeth, with a sneer, a needle, or a wallop in the balls — or arrowly.

Where arrow particularizes and images, and spreads its significance through resonance, aggression generalizes without serving communication. For what you, *Protestor*, conceive with "aggression," and the fantasies that the word evokes in your mind, may be quite other than my notions of it. That is why people who talk in concepts must define their terms in order to talk sensibly. Because aggression is second-level, an abstraction from an image, in therapy we have to locate it precisely in an image, even return aggression to its actual usage, the phenomenon as it appears. So why use the concept aggression at all in therapy? Why not just stick to the image from which the concept was derived?

But the most important difference between images and concepts is their mode of signifying. Now I will not be comparing arrow and aggression, but will be making a contrast between two ways of using arrow. As a *concept*, arrow signifies or refers to a thing, a noun — some arrow in your mind, in your bow, or in a sentence. As an *image*, it signifies itself, and its signification emerges less from its ability to refer to an arrow outside the word than from how the word works in its context. The more work we can get the word to do by inventing (*inventio* in classical rhetoric) implications, the more significant the arrow becomes.

This is crucial when working with dreams. When dream-words are regarded as concepts, then they take their significance from what they refer to. If these referents are high-powered words like the symbols we examined last year [baby, pearl, river — 71ff], then these nominal substantives become the focus of our attention. Our attention moves from the dream to the referents, amplifying the meaning of baby, pearl, and river abstracted from the dream. But when dream-words are regarded as images, then a big word is no

more powerful than little words like, "just then," "comes by," "I guess," etc. (Berry's "full democracy of the image"—1974, p. 64). We saw this in the example of the sister/Chevy/phone dream where we treated the words wholly imagistically [p. 78f]. There the dream-words took their signification from the image, its tension and implications. We did not regard beer or curb as substantial things or as nominatives that name substantial things and refer to them. Instead we explored the inhesion of these words in the image, the chords of response their placing and sounding evoked as analogies with psychological behavior. When we look at dreams as images, then we have to look at the dream's words doubly carefully, because there is nowhere else to look to find their significance.

This distinction between words as concepts and as images is also the basis for the difference between the scientific and the poetic understanding of dreams. In scientific discourse, words gain their significance from what they refer to. Science works in concepts and even its images are used conceptually. And the scientific view reads the words in dreams as descriptions of objective correlatives: the dream text is a secondary elaboration upon a primary process in nature that is invisible or unknowable and only represented by the dream. In contrast, a poetic understanding does not consider the dream as a report or message giving information about something other than, or prior to, the dream. Rather, the dream is like a poem or a painting which is not about anything, not even about the poet or the painter. The painted lemons on the plate must not refer to the lemons on a plate which the painter used as model; the painted lemons can be experienced altogether without reference to those lemons, or any lemons, anywhere. (Nor do they refer to an invisible archetypal essence of lemons — lemonhood, lemonness; they refer neither to physical lemons nor to metaphysical ones.) They may analogize with and evoke all sorts of lemony experiences; but the image transcends such referent evocations — that is, we might buy the painting, not because it so well represents lemons on a plate, but because it speaks so well to and of our soul.

So, too, with the lemon in a dream. The poetic view does not need to posit an objective psyche to which the lemon refers and

from which it is a message. The psyche is there in the lemon, located nowhere else than in the actual presented image. Psyche is image, as Jung said. We stick to the image because the psyche itself sticks there.

Hitherto, like other analysts, I tended to take dream-words conceptually, as referring to psychic contents. A cat in a dream indicated cattyness, animality, instinct, anima, pussy, Bastet, self-reliance, etc. In order to feel the image 'cat' I had to go outside the dream, either to symbolism, or personal associations, or to other dreams. But by playing with the dream-word in its context, running it through analogies, puns, and changes as we did in the examples last year, the particular cat emerges in its own image; and in the echo of the image, the other dreams, the personal associations, and the symbolic cat all reverberate.

Also, like other analysts, I felt somewhat dissatisfied with this conceptual approach to the image, and so continually reminded myself that I didn't really know to what the cat referred since it is a symbol. I remembered Jung said (CW 6, 815) that "cat" was not a sign referring to a known thing (Bastet, witch, self-centeredness), but was "the best possible formulation of a relatively unknown thing." Now, however, I can see that this "symbolic view," so essential to my "being a Jungian," *still treats the dream-word as a concept*. Whether the referent is known or unknown, it remains a thing. The symbolic view indeed does require nouns, concepts, substances. Even if we declare them to be unknown, we have not dissolved the conceptualizing move that makes for literalism in the first place and, in the second place, for all the theological, scientific, and metaphysical snarls of analytical psychology's view of dreams.

Protestor: "That move which dissolves nouns and which says that dream-words do not mainly refer to anything outside their context is self-destructive. Do you know what you are doing? You are now de-literalizing one of archetypal psychology's own favorite and basic moves, personifying. Your dissolving acid has got out of hand!"

I am doing away, not with personifying, but with the literal notion of these persons as agents in the psyche: complexes, Gods, archetypes — and other figures of speech and imaginative perspec-

tives that are taken literally because they are presented as nouns. Even when these figures are experienced in visions or as voices, and thus as nominative agents, we must remember that we hear them *only in an image*, as an image, and that they are inseparable from their imagistic appearance. Therefore they must be approached in accordance with the image in which they inhere. Otherwise we tend to abstract them from their context, mood, and specificity, turning them into enduring hypostases who give literal messages.

Protestor: "So there are no Gods? What about them as premises of your polytheistic psychology?"

Take the Gods too as adjectives and adverbs, as modes of qualifying and styling our perspectives. This is rather like the ancient Greek and Japanese way of speaking about Gods, not as things to which the word "God" refers, but as a sort of adverbial suffix that can be attached to other words, divinizing and sacralizing them. The theological problem in psychology arises when we take our words as concepts that refer to something outside or beyond, to something else signified by the word.

When we use words as tokens that point to real, objective contents which the words signify and gain their meaning from, then dream-words are not worth attention for themselves. They are mere stand-ins for the real actors. Whereas we have been demonstrating that the way the dream is presented *is* the way it is acting, and that it does not gain its meaning from what is not in the dream.

You know, we empty out each dream and the miracle of its presentation when we refer a dream outside itself. Analytical interpretations of dreams into empirical life — our past history, present problems, or future prospects — arise from treating the dream-words as concepts which signify something not in the dream. This analytical signification does not even have to be symbolistic, e.g., swan signifies anima, or Apollo, or death. Just the fact that the dream-swan must be referred to some sort of swan somewhere kills the bird as an image.

Images don't stand for anything. They gain their sense from where, when, and which way they stand. We can get meaning out of the sister/Chevy/phone dream, a significance that analogizes

many ways through my experiences, without those nouns having to refer to my sister, my Chevy, and my phone.

Protestor: "You mean they don't refer to the outer things but to inner objects . . . your inner anima, your drive, and your communicating apparatus as internal images?"

No, not that either. An internal object is still a noun, still a thing, even if now placed 'inside.' Internal objects don't differ in their logic from external ones: both entail that images be regarded as derivatives of referents. But an image is not an image *of* an object. It images itself. It imagines; and, in its imagining, whatever objects, wherever they are — lemons on a plate, sister in a Chevy — now become imaginal, parts of the image, as if painted, as if dreamt.

Internal objects are further analogies of the image. These analogies come into awareness only because of the image. Actually, the idea of my internal sister or car comes after the event of the dream, so that the internal object is an idea derived from the image, not the other way around. The concept of an internal object is a theoretical construct used to account for the image, though actually it is a result of the image. Unfortunately, we have all come to believe in these constructs as real things to which the images refer.

Protestor: "But you yourself still use 'thing words' — all those hyped-up Neoplatonic terms: Gods, archetypes, daimones. What's the value of doing that?"

You can hear the value. Instead of speaking of sexual attraction, or the eros principle, archetypal psychology may conjure with Aphrodite or the Venusian perspective. As we said last year, this way of speaking in archetypes is a mode of valuing, a way of giving volume, depth, necessity, universality to an experience. But these mythical figures cannot be taken for literal realities. Their actuality is wholly imaginal and any explanation of human behavior that rests on them rests on fantasy. They are by definition metaphors, and their main value is that they keep us in an imagistic perspective which conceptual language cannot do.

You see, we really do believe in the literal reality of Aggression and Sexual Desire. They are held to account for our behavior, and psychology says they can even be measured. But no one can tak

Mars and Venus in this literal way (except perhaps an astrologer). And that's just the beauty of Mars and Venus; they are Gods but do not operate as Gods. A God, after all, is defined not only by what theology says. Operationally, any word becomes a God when it posits itself as a dominating substantive or when we operate with the word as a literalized dominant. Religion isn't going to take over psychology because of Mars and Venus. Religion is already in psychology, in its pantheon of words that do not let us see through them. Aggression is only one of hundreds of these demons; Ego is probably their King and Feeling his Consort. And these verbal Gods are protected by a psychological priesthood which makes its daily obeisance by ritually attributing causal powers to a pantheon of psychological concepts which no one has ever seen and which are held to account for human behavior.

Protestor: "Now you are saying that there are no psychic contents whatsoever. Words, just words — and words that do not refer to anything. If Venus isn't a divine person, the arrow not related to arrows I can put in my bowstring, and my sister not even an internal psychic object, then of what is the psyche composed? If the arrow and my sister aren't factors in me that make me do things, factors that persist over time like a complex, how can I work on my arrow problem or my sister problem? How can I relate to it, talk to it in active imagination, watch its process by means of dreams? How can it be transformed?"

Now your fear of the image is finally coming out — but your fear is justified. By deliteralizing symbols, the thingness of psychic contents, we are also deliteralizing their transformation. Our acid is eating into an old tenet of therapeutic faith: transformation of the personality. You have pointed out that psychodynamics depends on symbolized concepts, psychic agents that do things to other things, an entire literalized system of nouns: types, functions, instincts, censors, archetypes, superegos, energies — and symbols. This is metaphysics, cosmology, theology — not psyche. The symbolic, conceptual view goes hand-in-hand with the development fantasy, i.e., the notion that we have inside ourselves fixed things that are subject to transformation. We can then watch the process of trans-

formation by observing the development of these fixed things. The Chevy moves through alchemical stages from black to white to red, indicating a transformation of the symbol of my driving vehicle. So, if there is no Chevy as an inner psychic thing

Protestor: "...there is no alchemy, and no transformation!"

You make me feel like Hume, but unless we see transformation or development *in actu*, we ought not use the word. We interpret dreams by means of the idea of transformation, but only rarely do we see a dream itself saying: "the bug transformed into a little girl," or "I then became the criminal whom the police were chasing." I prefer to speak of transformation only when I can point at its actually happening.

The story of black-to-white-to-red is imposed upon a series of dreams from outside the dreams. It is a scientific hypothesis or a theological tenet of faith, based on symbols. This is the symbolic view of dreams and I have been pointing out its dangers, both this year and last.

But we can still work with the idea of transformation in another way. When we shift the dream-words around, letting them play other parts of speech, transformation takes place right in our ears. A dream is itself transformational because it transforms its own statements through polyvalence of its images. A dream is always deepening and differentiating itself. We do not need to go beyond the dream for a developmental or energetic theory of psychic transformation.

But to release this transformative effect, we must lift the dream-words from the Procrustean bed of syntax and grammar, and allow words a Protean freedom to shape themselves imagistically. We must break free of the notion that a dream is using its words in the referring, indicating, signifying sense. Here, we return to Freud's view that a dream is not a message, but is a self-satisfying narcissistic event. Because the dream's words are not concepts that refer, no dream can be interpretatively translated to other referents. A dream can only be interpretatively re-imagined, as one does with a piece of any other poesis.

This leads to a further thought about soul-making. If an image

does not have to refer beyond itself to gain significance, neither does our therapy that works with and from images. Soul-making needs no external referent. The activity of therapy receives its meaning and value from the activity itself. We go to therapy for the sake of therapy and not for development, adjustment, healing, or individuation — processes to which therapy has been generally referred for its significance just as the image has been referred to external objects. If psyche is image, then psychological work or soul-making is image work, image-making, poesis, and the goal of therapy cannot be distinguished from the way it is performed.

Gadgets

Eternalizing. As is the Mercurial wont, a word slipped into an earlier section that was not adequately introduced. I said that one way “archetypal” implies value is by intimating “eternity.”

We don't want to get too almighty with that term; no metaphysics of eternity is intended here. I mean something operational, something we can actually do with an image to increase its volume.

Taking the when/then statement, let us change “when” to “whenever.” The sentence at once becomes immensely amplified, right out of a single time and into eternity.

An example from last year [p. 63]: “I turn toward daylight and my knee twists.” First let's put this into the when/then construction of the image: “When I turn toward daylight, then my knee twists,” or in reverse, “When my knee twists, then I turn toward daylight.” Now, let's carry it further by eternalizing: “Whenever I turn toward daylight, then my knee twists,” and “Whenever my knee twists, then I turn toward daylight.”

This bit of gadgetry, the attachment of an “-ever” suffix, eternalizes a connection that might too easily be passed over. It strengthens the hidden harmony (when/then) by making me feel that a particular connection in a dream is *always* going on in my life, a kind of eternal mechanism. My reaction to twisting my knee, to my weakness and pain and wobbly underpinning, is *ever* to turn to daylight. Whenever I am lame or limp, then I go for daylight. My

eternal turn toward daylight twists my knee, has a self-inflicted wound in it, is at the necessary cost of an unhinged connective joint which may no longer be able to bend (genuflect) or give generative support. That little “-ever” makes one feel that the connection is necessary, unavoidable. If it could be going on always, I will more likely watch for its analogies as habits, thereby spotting my habitual mechanisms in more places (always as all ways). And if a mechanism feels necessary, I may also become more tolerant of its pathological implications, for they too are necessary.

One can go further and eternalize a whole dream. Then we say to the dreamer: “Suppose this were the only dream you *ever* had, ever were to have. Never any other dream than this one.” At once the dream is lifted into a cosmological myth: the whole revelation of the psyche and its fate now there in this one dream. Its depth could never be plumbed, and one would give it endless time, intelligence, and love.

Eternalizing is a move of value, not a statement of fact. “Ever” is ‘only a metaphor’ and does not mean that a dream connection is always and everywhere literally going on. But it might be — and this metaphorical possibility tunes one in to listen for it. Besides, eternalizing adds more substance to the when/then connections, giving them the feeling of being fixed, interlocking mechanisms, a permanent synchronicity in the image stating an unchanging pattern in the soul. It is like saying that this is your eternal dream, so have an extra good look at what's going on here.

Contrasting. A dreamer says: “I have no idea in the world why I dreamt of Aunt Ella in a blue blouse. She was one of my Mother's three older sisters. I never met any of them. I like blue. I have two blue blouses but not the same shade as in the dream.”

In working with this sort of image and this sort of response to it, I find it useful to start a fantasy of contrasting. Often images that are closed because they are so familiar, or so freakish, block fantasy, so that the fantasy of contrast helps start it up again.

Why does the dream single out Aunt Ella, and not Emma or Aunt Etta? Where is Ella different from her sisters? Then we find

she never married, or lived the longest, or most resembled Mother. Why does the dream bother to dress her precisely in a blue blouse that is unlike the dreamer's own, and yet is not mauve or maroon? Then we find that that blue is a uniform color like at camp or school, or feels comfortable and goes with her eyes, or really belongs to older women. And so on with blouses over against shirts, halters, tops, dresses, etc.

Contrasting differs from *associating*, which edges off into personal reminiscences even in the face of a highly symbolic image like the moon. When I say, "So why the moon in this dream?" the dreamer may *associate* something about blue cheese, an article read yesterday on space-shots, or a feeling of irrational mystery. Then we would have to work on these associations as images, and would have left the actual dream far behind.

Contrasting differs also from *amplifying* which, as we already have discussed, moves away from the image in another direction — toward universal symbolism. In this case, the dreamer might respond to "Why the moon?" with something culled from alchemy, myth, or folklore.

But if we understand the question by means of contrasting, then we ask: "Why the moon and not the sun, not the earth, not a light in the night?" This move, unlike associating and amplifying, keeps us in the speech of images. We hold up *one image against another*. We stay in the genre of the dream, in the imagination. Our move may fetch images from afar, but we do not go astray by switching tracks into either personal associations or symbolic knowledge. Instead, we press the dreamer toward imagining a difference, asking for some specifics inhering in his or her moon image.

Then we get something like this: "It couldn't be the sun because the moon is cool; not the earth because the moon is so far away; not a light in the night because the moon was only a thin crescent." These three easy contrasts have increased the volume of the moon for this dreamer, telling us that his or her dream moon is particularized as a cool, remote, and thin-crescent image. Its particular feeling as an image begins to emerge, and contrasting has helped bring this out.

Singularizing. We can bring out particularity in another way. This way is similar to eternalizing, except that we now introduce the word "only" into the when/then construction.

"[*Only*] when you leave the cave, then you twist your knee." Or, "When you leave the cave, then [*only*] you twist your knee." At first this move seems a radical restriction of the dream statement. Indeed the dreamer may twist his knee on many other occasions in many other dreams. But since each dream is unique, then whatever inheres in it is also unique, occurring as such only in this particular image. We can then say quite legitimately that the intra-connection of the dream-image occurs only in the way it is stated by the dream.

The value of singularizing is that it specifies the occasion of that knee twist. We can say to the dreamer: It happens only when you go toward daylight, turn your back on the cave, hurry. Only leave that cave and, bang, your knee twists. Twisting your leg, losing your standpoint, finding your understanding wobbly — whatever that knee twist analogizes with — happens only at that singular instant of turning from cave to brilliance. We have been able to pinpoint a pathologizing instant; the *only* has allowed us to see a singular mechanism at work, allowed an insight into his singularity, individuality.

The restrictive value of "only" is especially helpful when a dreamer becomes contaminated by the symbolic effect of his images. Then they spread universally all through his consciousness. "I'm a mess. There's nothing left for me. My swan is shot down and dead — and with it my hopes for something really beautiful coming out of my work."

Here, we may singularize the dead swan as occurring *only* in the cave within the specific context, scene, and mood of his downward and backward deeper darkness and his reactions to it. The swan may still beat its great wings in his heart in other contexts. It is shot down and dead only in this single image. "Only" here helps keep us to the image, therapeutically preventing the dream from becoming symbolized into a message for his entire life, work, soul. An image is only an image.

Keeping Images. We often encourage the patient in analysis to hang in with the trouble, whatever the trouble, wherever it is. This therapeutic prescription derives partly from Freud. He made it a tenet of practice that no essential changes in a person's life — marriage, divorce, job, etc. — be undertaken during the analysis, because such moves would likely be displacements of neurotic conflicts. The prescription can also be derived from Jung's notion of the sealed alchemical vessel in which the psychic process of transformation takes place. One's soul stuff mustn't leak out and mustn't contaminate others.

But from the imagistic point of view, there is another reason for keeping, and a reason that may be less morally prescriptive.

Images so often start off in an opaque, dense condition. Such dreams especially need to be cracked open so as to enjoy their pathology and necessity, feel their essential value, their claim. But another mode of clearing their opacity is by keeping them. Rather than an imagery of walnuts, let's imagine them in terms of wine.

Often I receive a dream in analysis and haven't anything to say to it; there seems nothing I can do with it — or it seems just too hard to crack; I haven't the strength. I leave it behind, skip over it, go to the next. That's the usual move. But instead, I can keep the image (and tell the patient to keep it) around for a while, like standing a bottle of wine upright on the table in plain sight in the middle of my living space, letting it warm to room temperature. And sure enough, a sedimentation occurs; it begins to clear; it loses opacity; its specific quality lightens through the glass. It's ready to be appreciated, its subtleties disclosing themselves without heavy work.

After thirty minutes of waiting and watching the images of a dream, the whole concoction begins to clear. And one has done nothing more than just keep the image present with peripheral vision, an oblique awareness that accords it value without forcing too hard.

There are other ways of keeping images. Alchemy tells us to let matters cool, like keeping a dream in the refrigerator in a steady state, unusable, uncombinable, but letting it look at you every time

you open the door, making you wonder what can be done with it, what it goes with. Or one keeps seedlings that show no specific leafage — are they weeds, vegetables, flowers? — until they sprout of their own *vis naturalis*. Also, there is the backburner, a gentle heat, a slow brewing that encourages a fermentation of a dream throughout other dreams and images, like yeast moving through the whole psyche. Or, one can keep an image as one totes around a baby, over the hip, at the breast, on the back — the image as a weight, a non-verbal demand, that requires tiny attentiveness, little shifts of worry through the day, listening and smelling. Heraclitus says that the souls in the underworld perceive by smell: a subtle mode of sniffing the spirit that is going on in cooking, baby-care, wine, soil, telling us about time and changes.

Whatever fantasy we use for keeping — and there are many more which would have other purposes than clearing and differentiating, but rather to do with coagulating or with storing up in reserve — *keeping is for the sake of the image*. It is a way of attending to a *living* thing, like a wine, a dish of food, a sprout, a baby. Its aesthetic inutility in its primary state, that closedness that makes it feel such a bother, is met with the fantasy of the artisan or craftsman. (Plato's God was a craftsman, by the way, not a "creator.") No moral 'should,' here, in regard to the wine. No prescription, but a desire to enjoy the wine when it clears. Attention is paid, credit given, not for the sake of consciousness, the duty of analysis, but because you take delight in watching the behavior of psychic processes, the enjoyment of recognitions and insights as things disclose themselves, which they do if kept as gardeners and cooks, nurses and oenophiles 'keep.' Again, a model of doing and making in regard to psyche.

The Hiatus in the Image. Robert Grinnell (*Spring 1970*), in a pathfinding paper, noticed that there is a moment in a dream, a "hiatus which at once divides and unites the two portions of the dream." "The hiatus acts as the fulcrum and the turning point." He understands the hiatus to be where the mystery of the conjunction occurs. It is the arcane substance of the image itself, as well as the

arcane activity at work in and on that substance. It is non-representable, but indicated by a gap. In this gap a great deal is going on, says Grinnell.

There is not only an intended comparison with Jung's notion of the turning point in the dramatic structure of the dream. There is a further analogy with an idea mentioned twice by Freud in his *Interpretation of Dreams* where he refers to the "dream's navel, the spot where it reaches down into the unknown" and from where the image itself seems to emerge "like a mushroom out of its mycelium."

The "navel" suits the hiatus very well. It can be discovered in small, ordinary, and very common words in the very belly of an image. Look particularly to adverbs and conjunctions, some of which we have already drawn attention to: *suddenly, then, until, however, only, nevertheless, later, and most commonly, but*. When these occur in the midst of an image they announce a hiatus in the hidden connections which may be signifying a hidden disconnection, a juxtaposition that makes the spark of consciousness leap across empty space.

Whether the disconnection is 'merely' a formulation in the morning by the dreamer's mind which cannot tolerate the juxtapositions of seemingly non-sequential, and thus for him non-sensical, images so that he must turn the tension of the image into a disjunctive break in the written story, or whether the disjunction is 'truly' intrinsic to the image, this we cannot know for sure. But these small words reveal a nodal point, and if explored can mushroom into considerable complexity. They may be of more importance at getting to the root of a problem (Freud's earth image), into the primal lacuna of our consciousness (Grinnell's hiatus image), than are the visible images and connections themselves. For I suspect that in the little hiatus absconding Mercurius hides.

THE GREAT'S VIGOUR
A Study of the 34th Hexagram in the *I Ching*
WITH A NOTE ON CONSULTING THE *I CHING*

RUDOLF RITSEMA
(Ascona)

On Consulting the *I Ching*

One turns to the *I Ching* when one has a problem or a conflict that does not yield to the usual methods of problem-solving. As conceptual thinking shows no way out, the pressure of the conflict builds an impasse. It is at this point that the involuntary movements in handling the yarrow stalks give access to the archetypal realm of the *mundus imaginalis*. The immediate urgency of this moment is given a timeless background. Only the emotional pressure of a vitally and intensely experienced problem arouses this constellating power of the imaginal.

Usually a problem so emotionally charged is experienced initially in terms of exclusive alternatives. One wants either a yes or a no. And yet we cannot expect the images of the hexagram to solve our problem in the same terms that have led us into the deadlock in the first place. The *I Ching* does not serve as an oracle in the simple sense of responding to a dilemma with a direct reply. By not answering as one might like, the *I Ching* does not substitute for our human responsibility in facing our lives and risking ourselves with the unknown. It is a psychological instrument enabling us to become more aware of the deeper currents at work in any given moment.

Our problem may initially sound as follows: "I have to decide either this or that, each of which seems equally necessary or undesirable." Rather than answering the question as it appears at first,

Dedicated to my Aries and Capricorn friends who contributed to shape my account of this hexagram.

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