

PSYCHOLOGY: MONOTHEISTIC OR POLYTHEISTIC

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In the Conclusion to his late work *Aion*, heavily preoccupied with Christian symbolism, Jung writes: "The anima/animus stage is correlated with polytheism, the self with monotheism".¹ Although he pays high respect to the "numina, anima and animus"² and conceives the self as a conjunction, he nevertheless also implies that as anima/animus is a pre-stage of self, so is polytheism a pre-stage of monotheism. Moreover, he there also states that the self is "the archetype which it is most important for modern man to understand".³

The preference for self and monotheism presented there strikes to the heart of a psychology which stresses the *plurality* of the archetypes. (Archetypal psychology begins with Jung's notion of the complexes whose archetypal cores are the bases for all psychic life whatsoever.) A primacy of the self implies rather that the understanding of the complexes at the differentiated level once formulated as a polytheistic pantheon and represented, at its best, in the psyche of Greek antiquity and of the Renaissance, is of less significance for modern man than is the self of monotheism. Were this all, archetypal psychology would be nothing but an anima fantasy or an animus philosophy. Then, explorations of consciousness in terms of the Gods — Eros and Psyche, Saturn, Apollo, Dionysos — would be only preliminary to something more important: the self. Then, the self archetype would be paramount, and one should be investigating its phenomenology in the *quaternio*, the *conjunctio*, mandalas, synchronicity and the *unus mundus*. The question "polytheism or monotheism" represents a basic ideational conflict in Jungian psychology today. Which fantasy governs our view of soul-making and the process of individuation — the many or the one?

The very sound of the question shows already to what extent we are ruled by a bias towards the one. Unity, integration and individuation seem an advance over multiplicity and diversity. As the self seems a further integration than anima/animus, so seems monotheism superior to polytheism.

Placing the psychological part of this question to one side for the moment, let us first depose the ruling notion that in the history of religions or in the ethnology of peoples monotheism is a further, higher development out of polytheism. Radin devoted a monograph to this subject.⁴ He concluded: "... as most ethnologists and unbiased students would now admit, the possibility of interpreting monotheism as part of a general intellectual and ethical progress must be abandoned..." (p. 24). He argues forcefully and cogently against the evolutionary view: that monotheism emerges from, or is later or higher than, polytheism or animism (p. 29—30).

Radin bases monotheism not upon developmental stages but rather upon the idea of temperament. Some people everywhere are by temperament monotheistic; they have a monotheistic psychology. "All the monotheists, it is my claim, have sprung from the ranks of the eminently religious" (p. 25). "Such people are admittedly few in number..." "It is the characteristic of such individuals, I contend, always to picture the world as a unified whole..." (p. 25). These are the theological thinkers, a small elite in any culture, sharing a common temperament, and their influence upon their brethren in the same culture is stubborn and effective.

The inexpugnable persistence of monotheistic religion could be psychologically accounted for by Jung's theory of the self. Then we might be tempted to conclude that monotheism is so strong because it is the theological equivalent of a more complete, integrated and powerful (numinous) psychic condition. But already two objections crop up. First, Radin says monotheism "has obviously not been the triumph of the unifying principle over the disruptive" (p. 29). I take this to mean that religious and social order and disorder, unity and disunity cannot be correlated with monotheism and polytheism. Second, to base the strength of religious monotheism upon analogy with the psychologically more complete state of the self begs the same question which is nowhere established: the superiority of monotheism to polytheism. Per-

sistence does not necessarily demonstrate the superiority of monotheism, nor even its victory. Gray⁵ points out that two varying attitudes toward God can exist at one and the same time; the monolatry of Jahweh did exist among the Jews (even as late as the Exile period) side by side with the worship of other deities.

Despite the historical evidence of religions, there is a fond notion without adequate foundation that monotheism is the pinnacle and that "the evolution of religion thus manifests, it would seem, a definite tendency toward an integration of our mental and emotional life..." (Radin, p. 6). Jung may not be borne out by the historical facts of religion, but he is borne out by the psychological bias of the historians of religion who put monotheism on top in the name of integration.

Two examples help to show this bias towards evolutionary monotheism. In his examination of the decline of Greek religion, Nilsson⁶ finds the movement of religion from single, well-delineated Gods to a multiplicity of powers and daimons, a degeneration. The magic, superstition and occultism that prevailed in later periods was, according to Nilsson (of Protestant Sweden), a disintegration. A century earlier Schelling fantasied a vague *Urmonotheismus*, which developed later into a clearly formulated monotheism of the Old Testament as the highest product of religious consciousness. Between the first primitive monotheism and the later highly developed stage, there occurred Babel, which for Schelling represented the incursion of polytheism.

The hypothesis of the superiority of the self and monotheism over anima/animus and polytheism finds companions among historians of religion. Consequently, Jung's hypothesis may be one more expression of the theological temperament. This temperament has been more narrowly described as introversion, for Jung writes: "The monistic tendency belongs to the introverted attitude, the pluralistic to the extraverted."⁷ As in other areas of human activity, Jung sees the two tendencies in theology, where they are expressed as monotheism and polytheism, to be also "in constant warfare."⁸ Neither of these two attitudinal tendencies is superior to the other and neither is an evolution of the other. They are givens and given as equals.

So, too, we must keep distinct the ideas of individual and of cultural development, the self stage of the individual and the monotheistic stage of religion. It is nowhere established (despite E. Neumann) that

the stages of religious thought (if there are such things, and Radin doubts it) necessarily parallel stages of individual consciousness (if there are such things). Moreover, according to Radin, we should not think in developmental terms at all about the kinds of religion. Culture and religion do not move upwards from the many to the one, from disorder to order, from Babel to Jahweh: monotheism is not identical with superiority except from within its own *Anschauung*.

The idea of superior monotheism, and progressive stages towards it, has been instrumental to the notion of a superior self, attained through the progressive stages of individuation. Now since monotheistic superiority is questionable, so the superiority of monotheistic models for the self should as well be questioned.

Perhaps linear thinking in stages is but another reflection of a monotheistic temperament, whose Judeo-Christian fantasies favour historical development and hierarchical improvement, whereas the anima/animus and its model of polytheism tend toward a multiple field of circularity. Perhaps we should be less certain about stages of development in religion and in the individual, and more questioning of the kind of consciousness that perceives in terms of stages.

Our argument has already turned psychological. We are no longer examining the religious evidence presented by Radin, but rather the psychological theory he proposes, that is, monotheism results from "an intellectual-religious expression of a very special type of temperament and emotion".

We have already suggested in these pages⁹ last year which specific archetypal pattern tends to manifest in descriptions of the self. The self is personified as the Old Wise Man; its images are so often said to be ordering, e. g., geometric figures, crystals and stones, and abstractions beyond imagery; the behaviour associated with the self and the process which leads to it is usually presented in the language of introversion, generic to "children of Saturn". From the viewpoint of an archetypal psychology "the special type of temperament and emotion" that produces monotheism and favours the self above anima/animus and views their relation in stages would be the senex. This archetype might also help account for theological monotheism's obdurate persistence, religious intolerance and conviction of superiority. It might also account for the peculiarity of the self concept, which works sym-

bolically to unite the realms of religion and of psychology into an indiscriminate whole. This leads not only to theological confusions about psychologizing God — a problem with which Jung was ever bothered. It leads also to psychological confusions about theologizing the psyche, producing dogmas, propitiatory rites, priesthoods and worship. Likewise, the emphasis upon the self of psychological monotheism may help explain the theological interests of contemporary Jungians (as well as the Jungian interest of contemporary ministers) and the peculiar blending of analytical psychology with Christianity which we shall discuss below as the "Protestant direction".

II

What then about polytheism and the anima/animus? Let us first suspend monotheism, both in our theological judgments and our psychological convictions about stages, about unity and about linear and even spiral advancement. Let us also try to suspend the pervasive influence of our monotheistic desires for a utopia of integration (Kronos' Golden Age), and that fantasy of individuation which characterizes it mainly as a movement towards the Old Wise Man and which, by subtly obscuring the differences between psychological man and theological man, prepares the ground, in Radin's language, for a monotheistic elite of "eminently religious individuals", "admittedly few in number". By putting in suspension the senex domination of our attitudes, we might regard polytheism afresh, and *psychologically*.

Jung used a polycentric description for the objective psyche. He envisioned it as a multiplicity of partial consciousness, like stars or sparks or luminous fishes' eyes.¹⁰ Psychological polytheism corresponds with this description and provides its conceptual formulation in the traditional language of our civilization, i. e., classical mythology. By providing a divine background of personages and powers for each complex, it would find place for each spark. It would aim less at gathering them into a unity and more at integrating each fragment according to its own principle, giving each God its due over that portion of consciousness, that symptom, complex, fantasy which calls for an archetypal background. It would accept the multiplicity of voices, the Babel of the anima and animus, without insisting upon unifying them into one figure, and accept too the dissolution process into diver-

sity as equal in value to the coagulation process into unity. The pagan Gods and Goddesses would be restored to their psychological domain.

We would consider Artemis, Persephone, Athene, Aphrodite, for instance, as a more adequate *psychological* background to the complexity of human nature than the unified image of Maria, and the diversity expressed by Apollo, Hermes, Dionysos and Hercules, for instance, to correspond better with psychological actualities than any single idea of self, or single figure of Eros, or of Jesus or Jahweh.

Focus upon the many and the different (rather than upon the one and the same) also provides a variety of ways of looking at one psychic condition. There are many avenues for discovering the virtues in a psychic phenomena. Depression, say, may be led into meaning on the model of Christ and his suffering and resurrection; it may through Saturn gain the depth of melancholy and inspiration, or through Apollo serve to release the blackbird of prophetic insight. From the perspective of Demeter depression may yield awareness of the Mother-Daughter mystery, or, through Dionysos, we may find depression a refuge from the excessive demands of the ruling will.

This emphasis upon many dominants would then favour the differentiation of the anima/animus. Quite possibly — and now this is my claim and contention — closer interest in a variety of divine hypostases and their processes displayed in myth will prove more psychological, even if less religious (in the monotheistic sense of religion). This interest will more likely produce more insights into emotions, images and relationships, even if it be less encouraging for a theology of evolutionary wholeness. It will more likely reflect accurately the illusions and entanglements of the soul, even if it satisfies less the popular vision of individuation from chaos to order, from multiplicity to unity, and where the health of wholeness has come to mean the one dominating the many.

Polytheistic psychology obliges consciousness to circulate among a field of powers. Each God has his due as each complex deserves its respect in its own right. In this circularity there seem no preferred positions, no sure statements about positive and negative, and therefore no need to rule out some events as “pathological”. When the idea of progress through hierarchical stages is suspended, there will be more tolerance for the non-growth, non-upward and non-ordered compo-

nents of the psyche. There is more room for variance when there is more place given to variety. We may then discover that many of the judgments which have previously been called psychological were rather theological. They were statements about dreams and fantasies and behaviour, and people too, coming from a monotheistic ideal of wholeness (the self).

Monotheism or polytheism, self or anima/animus pose still another either/or: theology or psychology. Traditionally psychology deals with the second order of things, i.e., the emanated world of flux, diversity and the phenomenally imperfect. Its concern has traditionally been with the actualities of the soul, its modes of existence, its fantasies, emotions and experiences; whereas, theology considers the soul eschatologically, from the viewpoint of self. Wholeness defined by psychology means everything — all the phenomena as phenomena, things as they present themselves. Wholeness defined theologically means the one — things as they are in God. From this difference can arise two views of completion, a psychological wholeness where individuation shows itself as being what one is as one is, and a theological wholeness where individuation shows itself in degrees of approximation to an ideal of unity. The more I am occupied by the anima or animus the more will I be concerned with the welter of psychological phenomena. The more I am occupied by the self the more will I show concern with goal-states, peak-experiences, and universality.

From this superior vantage point, Babel and the proliferation of cults in the Hellenistic period always seem a degeneration. Likewise an “animus court” and its ambivalence, or the multiplicity of dream women, become but an inferior pre-stage of unity. (Remember how the Prophets warn against the promiscuity and harlotry of Israel.) The many-faceted world of Olympus must fade before a single God (even if in three persons).

But one might also consider the proliferation of cults as a *therapeia* (worship, service and care) of the complexes in their many forms. Then one could understand the psychic fragmentation supposedly typical of our times as the return of the repressed, bringing a return of psychological polytheism. Fragmentation would then indicate many possibilities for individuation and might even be the result of individuation: each individual struggling with his *daimones*. If there is only one model

of individuation can there be true individuality? The complexes that will not be integrated force recognition of their autonomous power. Their archetypal cores will not serve the single goal of monotheistic wholeness. Babel may be a religious decline from one point of view but it may also be a psychological improvement since through the many tongues complete psychic reality is being reflected. So the current delight in superstitions, witchery and oracles have a psychological significance even if they be considered inferior religion. Through these images and practices anima/animus aspects of the psyche begin to find traditional reflection and containment in an impersonal background. Without the Gods, who offer differentiated models for the peculiar psychic phenomena of anima and animus, we see them as projections. Then we try to take them back with introverted measures. But "The individual ego is much too small, its brain much too feeble, to incorporate all the projections withdrawn from the world. Ego and brain burst asunder in the effort; the psychiatrist calls it schizophrenia."¹¹ Without a consciously polytheistic psychology are we not more susceptible to an unconscious fragmentation called schizophrenia?

Monotheistic psychology counters disintegration with archetypal images of order (mandalas). Unity compensates plurality. Polytheistic psychology would meet disintegration in its own language and archetypal likeness; there would be less need for compensation through opposites.

The contrast between anima/animus and self appears in *Aion* as a contrast between pagan Gods and the *imago Dei*. Of the anima/animus Jung writes:

"They are quite literally the father and mother of all the disasterous entanglements of fate and have long been recognized as such by the whole world. Together they form a divine pair, one of whom . . . is characterized by *pneuma* and *nous*, rather like Hermes with his ever-shifting hues, while the other . . . wears the features of Aphrodite, Helen (Selene), Persephone, and Hecate. Both of them are unconscious powers, 'gods' in fact, as the ancient world quite rightly conceived them to be. To call them by this name is to give them that central position in the scale of values which has always been theirs whether consciously acknowledged or not . . ." ¹²

The self of psychological wholeness, briefly, more clearly reflects the God of monotheism and the senex archetype.

"Unity and totality stand at the highest point on the scale of objective values because their symbols can no longer be distinguished from the *imago Dei*. Hence all statements about the God-image apply also to the empirical symbols of totality. Experience shows that individual mandalas are symbols of *order*, and that they occur in patients principally during times of psychic disorientation or re-orientation. As magic circles they bind and subdue the lawless powers belonging to the world of darkness, and depict or create an order that transforms the chaos into a cosmos." ¹³

Let me hasten to make clear that a polytheistic psychology is also religious. In following Jung we are regarding the anima and animus in their divine forms and are giving "them the central position in the scale of values which have always been theirs". Religion is not defined by the number of its Gods, but rather in terms of the observance or binding of events to one or many Gods. Relating psychic events to many Gods and many powers and *daimones* should not be assumed to be a lessening of the glory of a single high God nor on the other hand a broadening of the single high God into something bigger and better. We can get away altogether from "better and worse" once we leave theological thinking and its monotheistic bias which sets the question in that kind of language. Polytheistic psychology has room for the preferential enactment of any particular myth in a style of life. One may be Protestant, or Herculean, or Dionysian, or a melancholic child of Saturn, according to the archetypal core governing one's dominant complex, and thus one's fate. And even the myths may change in a life, and the soul serve in its time many Gods. Polytheistic psychology would not suspend the commandment to have "no other Gods before me", but would extend that commandment for each mode of consciousness. Then, each archetypal possibility of the psyche — including those we now call psychopathological — could follow its principle of individuation within its particular divine model. No one model would be "before" another, since in polytheism the possibilities of existence are not jealous to the point of excluding each other. All are necessary in that they together serve one law only: necessity. Polytheism gives

archetypal psychology a religious mode even for psychopathology by suggesting an adequate background in myth for each of the sufferings of the soul.

III

The theme monotheism/polytheism is immensely complex and packed with energy. The best minds of the early centuries of our era were obsessed with this issue and from that conflict of paganism with Christianity¹⁴ our historical psyche and our psychological theory has been cast in what eventually became the current Protestant direction.

The essence of this direction reflects the Christian victory over the pagan world which can be summed up in a phrase from Gregory of Nazianzus, who, while praising the pagans for their culture, epitomized the method for integrating it into Christianity: "we take prisoner every thought for Christ".¹⁵ The one God swallows all the others; Pan was dead because monotheism had conquered. The variegated natural totality (Pan) of the pagan world's modes of being together with their attributes and traits and kinds of consciousness were taken prisoner through binding them to the one central image and myth. Monotheism fed like Kronos on the Gods it swallowed. As Christianity swelled, imprisoned "Greek philosophy [read psychology] sank exhausted into the arms of religion".¹⁶ Even were we to grant that this historical event was beneficial for religion — and there are others besides Nietzsche who would grudge any value to this victory — it was not necessarily beneficial for psychology. This because specific patterns of consciousness mimetic to various Gods of the old pantheon were deprived of their archetypal backgrounds and imprisoned by the Christian model whose perspective now made them seem pathological. They could return but through the back door of mental aberration. A pathological view towards many of the psyche's phenomena is inevitable if psychology does not keep alive the totality of archetypal forms and their different ways of viewing the soul and life. Should psychology prefer instead to merge the many ways into a wholeness determined by monotheism, ego towards self, "single one to single One",¹⁷ will it not too — did it not already — sink exhausted into the arms of religion?

The Protestant direction of analytical psychology crops out in many large and small ways. Currently we see it in: the emphasis upon

love as a panacea, without differentiation of the faces of love and awareness of tradition in regard to its constellations; the merit of hard work upon oneself; the inculcation of a 'strong ego' in therapy through the ennobling of choice, responsibility, commitment, and the consequent manipulation of guilt; trust in simplicity, naïveté and group emotion; an anti-intellectual, anti-logos bias where trust (*pistis*) in the 'unconscious' or the 'process' is enough; emphasis upon revelation (from dream, from oracle, imagination, psychosis, analyst, or from Jung); a peculiar combination of introverted religiosity and missionary popularization. We see it as well in the sole model for psychological suffering in which death's value is dislocated onto rebirth, a linear process of gaining a better condition in exchange for a worse. This model fundamentally devalues the existential importance of depression and the descent into dissolution *per se*. Downward phenomena are good, not in themselves, but rather because they offer hope for resurrection. It appears especially in the theological obsession with evil, which, let us recall, was not an issue in Greek polytheism. The Greeks had no Devil; each form of consciousness had its specific component of wrong-doing and tragedy. Evil was not a separate component, but a strand so woven throughout everything that the 'integration of the shadow' was already given in the patterns of life rather than a task for an ego to do. And the Protestant direction appears in the notion of the "ego-self axis", the confrontation between them, the new mid-point as a new covenant, and "Christ as paradigm of the individuating ego".¹⁸

When our model of individuation is governed by monotheistic psychology in its Protestant direction, every fantasy becomes a prisoner for Christ. Every fantasy cannot help but find meaning in terms of the one path, like the pilgrim on his progress towards integration. Even those that do not willingly fit in can be taken prisoner through the idea of a "pagan anima", a "chthonic animus", a "puer inflation", or the "problem of evil". These concepts bind psychic events to the dominant myth of the Protestant direction. Where once science, and then clinical pragmatics were the enemies of the psyche, today the threat to the psyche's freedom of symbol-formation is nothing else than fading Christianity coming back in the guise of a theology of the Self to claim the soul for its own. Releasing the swallowed Gods or the prisoners for Christ means realizing first how limited must be our her-

meneutic for psychic phenomena when we have a monotheistic model for totality.

Jung has pointed out that "the extermination of polytheism" goes hand in hand with the suppression of individual fantasy, and as "the Christian idea begins to fade, a recrudescence of individual symbol-formation may be expected".¹⁹ We may draw the conclusion that "individual symbol-formation" requires a polytheistic psychology, because the symbols refer to their likenesses in the variety of archetypal forms through which they find their authentication. Did Jung foresee that his stress upon totality and wholeness could be turned by the influential monotheism of our culture, and thus lead to a new one-sidedness? The *imitatio Christi*, no longer a religious dogma or practice, becomes a psychological dogma subtly channeling the vital flow of individual fantasy back into the one old vessel, now called "wholeness".

Jung's contrast of the Christian with the polytheistic suggests a tension between them in his soul. In the tribute to Jung at his funeral, the minister spoke of Jung as a heretic. Jung's heresy, if we may follow his minister in calling it so, was however one of extension and revision, not of denial. He added a fourth to the trinity and therewith the dimension of psychic reality to Christian dogma. Therewith too, the God within was re-affirmed. The experiential and phenomenological God of psychology included a fourth dimension, the underside of shadow, femininity and the pagan past. He added to the Christ of orthodoxy the wealth of alchemical imagery, and like the Christian philosophers of earlier ages he connected his explorations again and again with the Christ image. Moreover, his description of the *imago Dei* as the Self follows the monotheistic model, by subsuming the many opposites under the highest goal, union. Sharper heresy was avoided.

The East²⁰ (where the self notion, the mandala and the Old Wise Man image are first at home) and alchemy provided ways around the desperate issue of heresy which so obsessed the Renaissance giants and the more profound of the Romantics. Bruno, who posited a plurality of worlds, was forced out of the Dominican order and later burned; Ficino took another tack and in his mid-life was ordained into the Church's service. Wordsworth's mystical pantheism declined into woolly support of established religion. Coleridge, immersed fully in

the dilemmas of Neoplatonist polytheism (appearing in his day as pantheism), "regarded himself as an orthodox Church of England man".²¹ The tension between his imaginal, sensuous life and his Christian convictions was said to have been at the core of Coleridge's private agony. Blake followed the method of Gregory Nazianzus by taking every fantasy into the Judeo-Christian nexus. Those who started boldly into paganism — Shelley, Keats, Byron — died before the issue was fully upon them. Berdyaev believed the issue insoluble: "A pagan Renaissance is impossible in a Christian world, forever impossible".

Is this also true in the realm of psychology? Is the restoration of the pagan figures to their place as archetypal dominants of the psyche impossible in a monotheistic psychological world? If so, then we must abandon our attempts at an archetypal approach based on polycentricity and accept analytical psychology a prisoner for monotheism in its current Protestant direction and let psychology sink exhausted where it may. The task of psychology, let us stress, is not the reconciliation of monotheism and polytheism. Whether the many are each aspects of the one, or emanations of the one or its hypostases and persons is discussion for theology, not psychology. So, too, attempts to integrate the anima/animus into the self (as, for instance, the notion of stages) tend also to be theological: they present theories in the senex mode for integrating differences into a single order. The result generally disfavours the plurality of individual differences.

The way out of this dilemma is perhaps less theoretical than empirical. Which pattern offers my psyche in the mess of its complexes better options for meaning? Heuristic pragmatic criteria have always been decisive in choosing between rival structures of consciousness. Constantine became Christian (and through him our civilization) because the new monotheistic religion then offered redemption to lost areas of his psyche, which the paganism of the time could not quicken.²² "... the pagan cults were nothing but a confused medley, very loosely bound together by the customary dedication to 'all gods'. They had no common organization and tended to break up into their atoms."²³ The independence of the Greek city-states and of the Renaissance Italian cities, the cry of liberty in the name of paganism during the Romantic Revolution, as well as the contemporary separatist movements show on the political level a psychological dissociation away from central

authority. Translating these polytheistic and separatist phenomena into a psychological metaphor we have Jung's vision of the objective psyche where the atoms reflect the multiple sparks.

Monotheism evidently provided Constantine's psyche with the central focus then needed. Today, may not the situation be the reverse? Can the atomism of our psychic paganism, that is, the rash of individual symbol-formation now breaking out as the Christian cult fades, be contained by a psychology of self-integration that echoes its expiring Christian model? If so, then indeed, the self is "the archetype which it is most important for modern man to understand". The answer hangs in the historical balance; and the scale, so loaded with recrudescing individual fantasies is surely tipping away from monotheism's definition of order and its *imago Dei*. The danger is that a true revival of paganism as *religion* is then possible, with all its accoutrements of popular soothsaying, quick priesthoods, astrological divination, extravagant practices and the erosion of psychic differentiations through delusional enthusiasms. The self does not provide bulwark since its monotheistic description and protestant interpretation leave too much out. But when the self can be re-imagined through a variety of ambiguous archetypal perspectives and less assuredly through the senex, consciousness can find containers for its individual symbol-formations. To meet the revival of paganism as religion we need adequate psychological models that give full credit to the psyche's inherent polytheism, thereby providing *psychological vessels* for the sparks. They may burst into religious conflagrations when left psychologically unattended or when forced into monotheistic integrations that simply do not work.

The restoration of the Gods and Goddesses as psychic dominants reflects truly both the varied beauty and messy confusion, and tragic limitation, of the anima/animus, their fascinating multiplicity, their conflicts, their lack of ethical cohesion, their tendency to draw us deep through life and into death. Polytheistic psychology can give sacred differentiation to our psychic turmoil and can welcome its outlandish individuality in terms of classical patterns.

The elaboration of these patterns in psychological terms is yet to be done. We have yet to understand Artemis and Persephone, Apollo and Poseidon, in terms of our soul-images and behaviour. Although Jung did devote much space in his works to the divine couple and their con-

figurations, and also to the personal aspects of the anima and animus in our lives, he concentrated mainly upon the phenomenology of the self archetype. The same thorough work needs to be done upon the anima/animus. But before this work can be done we would have to recognize their importance and see things from within their archetypal perspective, i. e., in terms of a polytheistic psychology. Hence the urging in these remarks. The idea of four stages²⁴ of the anima and animus, inspired mainly from Goethe and where progression moves away from the physical and toward the spiritual, is only an initial attempt at an anima/animus phenomenology in terms of classical mythology. Until we follow Jung in examining the differentiation of wholeness with the same care that he applied to the integration of wholeness our psychology does not meet the psyche's need for archetypal understanding of its problems.

If there are other psychological options for our need I cannot find them. These ideas and their presentation leaves much unsatisfied, and so others who may see the question and its answers more clearly are invited to respond to this issue along lines laid out here.

- 1 C. G. Jung, *Coll. Works* 9, ii, para. 427.
- 2 *Ibid.*, para. 425.
- 3 *Ibid.*, para. 422.
- 4 P. Radin, *Monotheism Among Primitive Peoples* (Ethnographical Museum), Basel, Bollingen Foundation, Special Publ. 4, 1954.
- 5 C. B. Gray, *Hebrew Monotheism* (Oxford Society of Historical Theology, Abstract of Proceedings, 1922—23), cited by Radin, p. 22. On the polytheism that existed side by side with Greek monotheism, see M. P. Nilsson, *Greek Piety* ("Monotheism"), New York (Norton Paperback), 1969, pp. 116—17. Judeo-Christian monotheism in its conflict with Greek paganism however was intolerant of co-existence, cf. Nilsson, p. 124.
- 6 M. P. Nilsson, "The Dionysiac Mysteries of the Hellenistic and Roman Age", *Skr. utg. Svenska Inst. Athen*, 8, V, Lund, 1957. Cf. *Greek Piety*, *op. cit. sup.*, last chapter.
- 7 Jung, *Psychological Types*, London, 1923 (1949), p. 396.
- 8 *Coll. Works* 5, para. 149.
- 9 J. Hillman, "On Senex Consciousness", *Spring* 1970, N.Y., 1970, p. 153.
- 10 *Coll. Works* 8, para. 388 ff.
- 11 *Coll. Works* 11, para. 145.
- 12 *Coll. Works* 9, ii, para. 41.
- 13 *Coll. Works* 9, ii, para. 60.
- 14 A. Momigliano (ed.), *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*, London, 1963; see too E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, Cambridge, 1965, for concise psychological characterization of the age and for references.

- 15 Gregory of Nazianzus, "In Praise of Basil" (*Pat. Gr.* 36, 508), quoted in English from J. Shiel, *Greek Thought and the Rise of Christianity*, London, 1968, p. 76. See further, B. Delfgaauw, "Gregor von Nazianz: Antikes und christliches Denken", *Eranos Jahrbuch* XXXVI, Zurich, 1967.
- 16 "Here knowledge is replaced by revelation in ecstasy. After Greek philosophy had performed this self-castration it sank exhausted into the arms of religion; as Proclus expresses in one of his hymns to the gods: 'And so let me anchor, weary one, in the haven of piety.'" E. Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, London, 1931, pp. 313—315, quoted from J. Shiel, *op. cit. sup.*
- 17 "... this is the way to pray as single one to single one." Plotinus, *Enneads* V, 1, 6 (Shiel transl.), or "alone towards the alone" (Mackenna transl.). Cf. V. 9, 11: "solitary to solitary".
- 18 For basic formulations of the Protestant direction see particularly the writings of E. Edinger: "Christ as Paradigm of the Individuating Ego", *Spring* 1966, N.Y.; "The Ego-Self Paradox", *J. Analyt. Psychol.* V, 1, London 1960; "Ralph Waldo Emerson: Naturalist of the Soul", *Spring* 1965, N.Y., where we find (p. 97) the following passage: "In the process of assimilating the old culture to the new psychology, we discover again and again colleagues of the spirit. Emerson is such a colleague. He was a dedicated forerunner of the new world view that is only now beginning to reach its full emergence. The essence of this new view is well expressed by another colleague of the spirit, Teilhard de Chardin." The emphasis in both Emerson and Teilhard de Chardin is clearly upon a transcendental evolutionary wholeness. But Jung has been given many other kinds of spiritual colleagues. In textbooks he is grouped with Freud and Adler; in his own writings we find suggestions that he looks back upon a spiritual line that includes Goethe, Carus, Kerner and the French alienists of the nineteenth century; that abrasive scandal to authority, Paracelsus, and Nietzsche too, can be colleagues of the spirit. Jung has also been placed alongside of Tillich and Buber, called the true successor of William James, and given for spiritual colleagues the Masters of the East, Albert Schweitzer, the Gnostics, and others too numerous and irrelevant to mention. The fact that there are these many views regarding Jung and his work is further witness to his multiple psychology and the multiplicity of viewpoints, i. e., polytheistic psychology, in general. The Protestant direction is only one ray in the spectrum.
- 19 *Coll. Works* 8, para. 92.
- 20 For one instance of the Eastern reinforcement of monotheistic psychology see Jung's "Psychological Commentary on 'The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation'", *Coll. Works* 11, para. 798, beginning: "'There being really no duality, pluralism is untrue.' This is certainly one of the most fundamental truths of the East..."
- 21 T. McFarland, *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition*, Oxford, 1969, p. 220; see further, p. 223.
- 22 A. Alföldi, *The Conversion of Constantine and Pagan Rome*, Oxford, 1948 (1969), p. 8.
- 23 Alföldi, *op. cit.*, p. 12, where the presentation of the Christian victory over paganism is put altogether as a conquest by monotheism over polytheism.
- 24 On the four levels of the anima, see *Coll. Works* 16, para. 361; on the four levels of the animus, taken from *Faust*, see, E. Jung, *Animus and Anima*, N.Y. (Spring Publications), 1969 (3rd printing), p. 2f. For an elaboration of the anima in terms of the Greek Kore figure, see *Coll. Works* 9, i, para. 306—383.